Differentially Private High Dimensional Sparse Covariance Matrix
  Estimation by Wang, Di & Xu, Jinhui
Differentially Private High Dimensional Sparse Covariance
Matrix EstimationI,II
Di Wanga,∗, Jinhui Xua
aDepartment of Computer Science and Engineering
State University of New York at Buffalo
338 Davis Hall, Buffalo, 14260
Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of estimating the covariance matrix under differ-
ential privacy, where the underlying covariance matrix is assumed to be sparse and of
high dimensions. We propose a newmethod, called DP-Thresholding, to achieve a non-
trivial 퓁2-norm based error bound, which is significantly better than the existing onesfrom adding noise directly to the empirical covariance matrix. We also extend the 퓁2-norm based error bound to a general 퓁푤-norm based one for any 1 ≤ 푤 ≤ ∞, andshow that they share the same upper bound asymptotically. Our approach can be eas-
ily extended to local differential privacy. Experiments on the synthetic datasets show
consistent results with our theoretical claims.
Keywords: Differential privacy, sparse covariance estimation, high dimensional
statistics
1. Introduction
Machine Learning and Statistical Estimation have made profound impact in recent
years to many applied domains such as social sciences, genomics, and medicine. Dur-
ing their applications, a frequently encountered challenge is how to deal with the high
dimensionality of the datasets, especially for those in genomics, educational and psy-
chological research. A commonly adopted strategy for dealing with such an issue is to
assume that the underlying structures of parameters are sparse.
Another often encountered challenge is how to handle sensitive data, such as those
in social science, biomedicine and genomics. A promising approach is to use some dif-
ferentially private mechanisms for the statistical inference and learning tasks. Differ-
ential Privacy (DP) [1] is a widely-accepted criterion that provides provable protection
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against identification and is resilient to arbitrary auxiliary information that might be
available to attackers. Since its introduction over a decade ago, a rich line of works are
now available, which have made differential privacy a compelling privacy enhancing
technology for many organizations, such as Uber [2], Google [3], Apple [4].
Estimating or studying the high dimensional datasets while keeping them (locally)
differentially private could be quite challenging formany problems, such as sparse linear
regression [5], sparsemean estimation [6] and selection problem [7]. However, there are
also evidences showing that the loss of some problems under the privacy constraints can
be quite small compared with their non-private counterparts. Examples of such nature
include high dimensional sparse PCA [8], sparse inverse covariance estimation [9], and
high-dimensional distributions estimation [10]. Thus, it is desirable to determine which
high dimensional problem can be learned or estimated efficiently in a private manner.
In this paper, we try to give an answer to this question for a simple but fundamen-
tal problem in machine learning and statistics, called estimating the underlying sparse
covariance matrix of bounded sub-Gaussian distribution. For this problem, we propose
a simple but nontrivial (휖, 훿)-DP method, DP-Thresholding, and show that the squared
퓁푤-norm error for any 1 ≤ 푤 ≤ ∞ is bounded by 푂( 푠2 log 푝푛휖2 ), where 푠 is the sparsityof each row in the underlying covariance matrix. Moreover, our method can be easily
extended to the local differentialy privacy model. Experiments on synthetic datasets
confirm the theoretical claims. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper study-
ing the problem of estimating high dimensional sparse covariance matrix under (local)
differential privacy.
2. Related Work
Recently, there are several papers studying private distribution estimation, such as
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. For distribution estimation under the central differential privacy
model, [12] considers the 1-dimensional private mean estimation of a Gaussian distri-
bution with (un)known variance. The work that is probably most related to ours is [10],
which studies the problem of privately learning a multivariate Gaussian and product
distributions. The following are the main differences with ours. Firstly, our goal is to
estimate the covariance of a sub-Gaussian distribution. Even though the class of dis-
tributions considered in our paper is larger than the one in [10], it has an additional
assumption which requires the 퓁2 norm of a sample of the distribution to be boundedby 1. This means that it does not include the general Gaussian distribution. Secondly,
although [10] also considers the high dimensional case, it does not assume the sparsity
of the underlying covariance matrix. Thus, its error bound depends on the dimension-
ality 푝 polynomially, which is large in the high dimensional case (푝 ≫ 푛), while the
dependence in our paper is only logarithmically (i.e., log 푝). Thirdly, the error in [10]
is measured by the total variation distance, while it is by 퓁푤-norm in our paper. Thus,the two results are not comparable. Fourthly, the methods in [10] seem difficult to be
extended to the local model. [14] recently also studies the covariance matrix estimation
via iterative eigenvector sampling. However, their method is just for the low dimen-
sional case and with Frobenious norm as the error measure.
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Distribution estimation under local differential privacy has been studied in [13, 11].
However, both of them study only the 1-dimensional Gaussian distribution. Thus, it is
quite different from the class of distributions in our paper.
In this paper, we mainly use Gaussian mechanism to the covariance matrix, which
has been studied in [15, 8, 9]. However, as it will be shown later, simply outputting
the perturbed covariance can cause big error and thus is insufficient for our problem.
Compared to these problems, ours is clearly more complicated.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [1] is by now a defacto standard for statistical data privacy
which constitutes a strong standard for privacy guarantees for algorithms on aggre-
gate databases. One likely reason that it gains so much popularity is its guarantee of
no significant change on the outcome distribution when there is one entry change to the
dataset. We say that two datasets 퐷,퐷′ are neighbors if they differ by only one entry,
denoted as 퐷 ∼ 퐷′.
Definition 1 (Differentially Private[1]). A randomized algorithm is (휖, 훿)-differentially
private (DP) if for all neighboring datasets 퐷,퐷′ and for all events 푆 in the output
space of, the following holds
ℙ((퐷) ∈ 푆) ≤ 푒휖ℙ((퐷′) ∈ 푆) + 훿.
When 훿 = 0, is 휖-differentially private.
We will use Gaussian Mechanism [1] to guarantee (휖, 훿)-DP.
Definition 2 (Gaussian Mechanism). Given any function 푞 ∶ 푛 → ℝ푝, the Gaussian
Mechanism is defined as:
퐺(퐷, 푞, 휖) = 푞(퐷) + 푌 ,
where Y is drawn from Gaussian Distribution  (0, 휎2퐼푝) with 휎 ≥
√
2 ln(1.25∕훿)Δ2(푞)
휖 .
Here Δ2(푞) is the 퓁2-sensitivity of the function 푞, i.e.
Δ2(푞) = sup
퐷∼퐷′
||푞(퐷) − 푞(퐷′)||2.
Gaussian Mechanism preservers (휖, 훿)-differential privacy.
3.2. Private Sparse Covariance Estimation
Let 푥1, 푥2,⋯ , 푥푛 be 푛 random samples from a 푝-variate distribution with covariancematrix Σ = (휎푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푝, where the dimensionality 푝 is assumed to be high, i.e., 푝 ≫ 푛 ≥Poly(log 푝).
We define the parameter space of 푠-sparse covariance matrices as the following:
0(푠) = {Σ = (휎푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푝 ∶ 휎−푗,푗 is 푠-sparse ∀푗 ∈ [푝]}, (1)
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where 휎−푗,푗 means the 푗-th column of Σ with the entry 휎푗푗 removed. That is, a matrixin 0(푠) has at most 푠 non-zero off-diagonal elements in each column.We assume that each 푥푖 is sampled from a 0-mean and sub-Gaussian distributionwith parameter 휎2, that is,
피[푥푖] = 0,ℙ{|푣푇 푥푖| > 푡} ≤ 푒− 푡22휎2 ,∀푡 > 0 and ‖푣‖2 = 1. (2)
This means that all the one-dimensional marginals of 푥푖 have sub-Gaussian tails. Wealso assume that with probability 1, ‖푥푖‖2 ≤ 1. We note that such assumptions are quitecommon in the differential privacy literature, such as [8].
Let 푑(휎2, 푠) denote the set of distributions of 푥푖 satisfying all the above conditions(ı.e., (2) and ‖푥푖‖2 ≤ 1) and with the covariance matrix Σ ∈ 0(푠). The goal of privatecovariance estimation is to obtain an estimatorΣpriv of the underlying covariance matrix
Σ based on {푥1,⋯ , 푥푛} ∼ 푃 ∈ 푑(휎2, 푠) while keeping it differnetially private. In thispaper, we will focus on the (휖, 훿)-differential privacy. We use the 퓁2 norm to measurethe difference between Σpriv and Σ, i.e., ‖Σpriv − Σ‖2.
Lemma 1. Let {푥1,⋯ , 푥푛} be 푛 random variables sampled from Gaussian distribution (0, 휎2). Then
피max
1≤푖≤푛 |푥푖| ≤ 휎√2 log 2푛, (3)
ℙ{max
1≤푖≤푛 |푥푖| ≥ 푡} ≤ 2푛푒− 푡22휎2 . (4)
Particularly, if 푛 = 1, we have ℙ{|푥푖| ≥ 푡} ≤ 2푒− 푡22휎2 .
Lemma 2 ([16]). If {푥1, 푥2,⋯ , 푥푛} are sampled form a sub-Gaussian distribution in
(2) and Σ∗ = (휎∗)1≤푖,푗≤푝 = 1푛
∑푛
푖=1 푥푖푥
푇
푖 is the empirical covariance matrix, then there
exist constants 퐶1 and 훾 > 0 such that ∀푖, 푗 ∈ [푝]
ℙ(|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| > 푡) ≤ 퐶1푒−푛푡2 8훾2 (5)
for all |푡| ≤ 훿, where 퐶1 and 훾 are constants and depend only on 휎2. Specifically,
ℙ{|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| > 훾√ log 푝푛 } ≤ 퐶1푝−8. (6)
4. Method
4.1. A First Approach
A direct way to obtain a private estimator is to perturb the empirical covariance ma-
trix by symmetric Gaussian matrices, which has been used in previous work on private
PCA, such as [15, 8]. However, as we can see bellow, this method will introduce big
error.
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By [15], for any give 0 < 휖, 훿 ≤ 1 and {푥1, 푥2,⋯ , 푥푛} ∼ 푃 ∈ 푝(휎2, 푠), thefollowing perturbing procedure is (휖, 훿)-differentially private:
Σ̃ = Σ∗ +푁 = (휎̃푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푝 = 1푛
푛∑
푖=1
푥푖푥
푇
푖 +푁, (7)
where 푁 is a symmetric matrix with its upper triangle ( including the diagonal) being
i.i.d samples from  (0, 휎21 ); here 휎21 = 2 ln(1.25∕훿)푛2휖2 , and each lower triangle entry is
copied from its upper triangle counterpart. By [17], we know that ‖푁‖2 ≤ 푂(√푝휎1) =
푂(
√
푝
√
log 1훿
푛휖 ). We can easily get that
‖Σ̃ − Σ‖2 ≤ ‖Σ∗ − Σ‖2 + ‖푁‖2 ≤ 푂(
√
푝 log 1훿
푛휖
), (8)
where the second inequality is due to [18]. However, we can see that the upper bound
of the error in (8) is quite large in the high dimensional case.
Another issue of the private estimator in (7) is that it is not clear whether it is
positive-semidefinite, a property that is normally expected from an estimator.
4.2. Post-processing via Thresholding
We note that one of the reasons that the private estimator Σ̃ in (7) fails is due to the
fact that some entries are quite large which make ‖Σ̃푖푗 − Σ푖푗‖2 large for some 푖, 푗. Tosee it more precisely, by (4) and (5) we can get the following, with probability at least
1 − 퐶푝−6, for all 1 ≤ 푖, 푗 ≤ 푝,
|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≤ 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
= 푂(훾
√
log 푝
푛휖2
). (9)
Thus, to reduce the error, it is natural to think of the following way. For those 휎푖푗with larger values, we keep the corresponding 휎̃푖푗 in order to make their difference lessthan some threshold. For those 휎푖푗 with smaller values compared with (9), since thecorresponding 휎̃푖푗 may still be large, if we threshold 휎̃푖푗 to 0, we can lower the error on
휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗 .Following the above thinking and the thresholding methods in [16] and [19], we
propose the following DP-Thresholding method, which post-processes the perturbed
covariancematrix in (7) with the threshold 훾
√
log 푝
푛 +
4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖 . After threshold-
ing, we further threshold the eigenvalues of Σ̂ in order to make it positive semi-definite.
See Algorithm 1 for detail.
Theorem 1. For any 0 < 휖, 훿 ≤ 1, Algorithm 1 is (휖, 훿)-differentially private.
Proof. By [8] and [15], we know that Step 1 keeps the matrix (휖, 훿)-differentially pri-
vate. Thus, Algorithm 1 is (휖, 훿)-differentially private due to the post-processing prop-
erty of differential privacy [1].
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Algorithm 1 DP-Thresholding
퐈퐧퐩퐮퐭: 휖, 훿 are privacy parameters and {푥1, 푥2,⋯ , 푥푛} ∼ 푃 ∈(휎2, 푠).
1: Compute
Σ̃ = (휎̃푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푝 = 1푛
푛∑
푖=1
푥푖푥
푇
푖 +푁,
where 푁 is a symmetric matrix with its upper triangle (including the diagonal)
being i.i.d samples from  (0, 휎21 ); here 휎21 = 2 ln(1.25∕훿)푛2휖2 , and each lower triangleentry is copied from its upper triangle counterpart.
2: Define the thresholding estimator Σ̂ = (휎̂푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푛 as
휎̂푖푗 = 휎̃푖푗 ⋅ 퐼[|휎̃푖푗| > 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
]. (10)
3: Let the eigen-decomposition of Σ̂ as Σ̂ = ∑푝푖=1 휆푖푣푖푣푇푖 . Let 휆+ = max{휆푖, 0} be thepositive part of 휆푖, then define Σ+ = ∑푝푖=1 휆+푣푖푣푇푖 .4: return Σ+.
For the matrix Σ̂ in (10) after the first step of thresholding, we have the following
key lemma.
Lemma 3. For every fixed 1 ≤ 푖, 푗 ≤ 푝, there exists a constant 퐶1 > 0 such that with
probability at least 1 − 퐶1푝
− 92 , the following holds:
|휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≤ 4min{|휎푖푗|, 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
}. (11)
Proof of Lemma 3. Let Σ∗ = (휎∗푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푝 and 푁 = (푛푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푝. Define the event 퐴푖푗 =
{|휎̃푖푗| > 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4√2 ln 1.25∕훿√log 푝푛휖 }. We have:|휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗| = |휎푖푗| ⋅ 퐼(퐴푐푖푗) + |휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ⋅ 퐼(퐴푖푗). (12)
By the triangle inequality, it is easy to see that
퐴푖푗 =
{|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗 + 휎푖푗| > 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
}
⊂
{|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| > 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
− |휎푖푗|}
and
퐴푐푖푗 =
{|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗 + 휎푖푗| ≤ 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
}
⊂
{|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| > |휎푖푗| − (훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
)
}
.
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Depending on the value of 휎푖푗 , we have the following three cases.
Case 1. |휎푖푗| ≤ 훾4√ log 푝푛 + √2 log 1.25∕훿√log 푝푛휖 . For this case, we have
ℙ(퐴푖푗) ≤ ℙ(|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| > 3훾4
√
log 푝
푛
+
3
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
) ≤ 퐶1푝− 92 + 2푝− 92 .
(13)
This is due to the followings:
ℙ
(|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| > 3훾4
√
log 푝
푛
+
3
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
) (14)
≤ ℙ(|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| > 3훾4
√
log 푝
푛
+
3
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
) − |푛푖푗|) (15)
= ℙ
(
퐵푖푗
⋂{3√2 ln 1.25∕훿√log 푝
푛휖
) − |푛푖푗| > 0}) (16)
+ ℙ
(
퐵푖푗
⋂{3√2 ln 1.25∕훿√log 푝
푛휖
) − |푛푖푗| ≤ 0}) (17)
≤ ℙ(|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| > 3훾4
√
log 푝
푛
) + ℙ(
2
√
3 ln 1.25∕훿 log 푝
푛휖
) ≤ |푛푖푗|) (18)
≤ 퐶1푃− 92 + 2푝− 92 , (19)
where event 퐵푖푗 denotes 퐵푖푗 = {|휎∗푖푗 −휎푖푗| > 3훾4 √ log 푝푛 + 2√2 ln 1.25∕훿 log 푝푛휖 ) − |푛푖푗|}, andthe last inequality is due to (4) and (5).
Thus by (12), with probability at least 1 − 퐶1푝−
9
2 − 2푝−
9
2 , we have
|휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗| = |휎푖푗|,
which satisfies (11).
Case 2. |휎푖푗| ≥ 2훾√ log 푝푛 + 8√2 ln 1.25∕훿√log 푝푛휖 ). For this case, we have
ℙ(퐴푐푖푗) ≤ ℙ(|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≥ 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
) ≤ 퐶1푝−8 + 2푝−8,
where the proof is the same as (13-17). Thus, with probability at least 1−퐶1푝−
9
2 −2푝−8,
we have |휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗| = |휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗|. (20)
Also, by (9), (11) also holds.
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Case 3. Otherwise,
훾
4
√
log 푝
푛
+
√
2 log 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
≤ |휎푖푗| ≤ 2훾√ log 푝푛 + 8
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
).
For this case, we have |휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗| = |휎푖푗| or |휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗|. (21)
When |휎푖푗| ≤ 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4√2 ln 1.25∕훿√log 푝푛휖 , we can see from (9) that with probability at
least 1 − 2푝−6 − 퐶1푝−8,
|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≤ 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
≤ 4|휎푖푗|.
Thus, (11) also holds.
Otherwise when |휎푖푗| ≤ 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4√2 ln 1.25∕훿√log 푝푛휖 , (11) also holds. Thus, Lemma3 is true.
By Lemma 3, we have the following upper bound on the 퓁2-norm error of Σ+.
Theorem 2. The output Σ+ of Algorithm 1 satisfies:
피‖Σ̂ − Σ‖22 = 푂(푠2 log 푝 log 1훿푛휖2 ), (22)
where the expectation is taken over the coins of the Algorithm and the randomness of
{푥1, 푥2,⋯ , 푥푛}.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first show that ‖Σ+ − Σ‖2 ≤ 2‖Σ̂ − Σ‖2. This is due to thefollowing
‖Σ+ − Σ‖2 ≤ ‖Σ+ − Σ̂‖2 + ‖Σ̂ − Σ‖2 ≤ max푖∶휆푖≤0 |휆푖| + ‖Σ̂ − Σ‖2
≤ max
푖∶휆푖≤0 |휆푖 − 휆푖(Σ)| + ‖Σ̂ − Σ‖2 ≤ 2‖Σ̂ − Σ‖2,
where the third inequality is due to the fact that Σ is positive semi-definite.
This means that we only need to bound ‖Σ̂ − Σ‖2. Since Σ̂ − Σ is symmetric, weknow that ‖Σ̂ − Σ‖2 ≤ ‖Σ̂ − Σ‖1 [20]. Thus, it suffices to prove that the bound in (22)holds for ‖Σ̂ − Σ‖1.We define event 퐸푖푗 as
퐸푖푗 = {|휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≤ 4min{|휎푖푗|, 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
}}. (23)
Then, by Lemma 3, we have ℙ(퐸푖푗) ≥ 1 − 2퐶1푝− 92 .
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Let 퐷 = (푑푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푝, where 푑푖푗 = (휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗) ⋅ 퐼(퐸푐푖푗). Then, we have
‖Σ̂ − Σ‖21 ≤ ‖Σ̂ − Σ −퐷 +퐷‖21
≤ 2‖Σ̂ − Σ −퐷‖21 + 2‖퐷‖21
≤ 4(sup
푗
∑
푖≠푗
|휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗|퐼(퐸푖푗))2 + 2‖퐷‖21 + 푂( log 푝 log 1훿푛휖2 ). (24)
We first bound the first term of (24). By the definition of 퐸푖푗 and Lemma 3, we canupper bounded it by
(sup
푗
∑
푖≠푗
|휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗|퐼(퐸푖푗))2
≤ 16(sup
푗
∑
푖≠푗
min{|휎푖푗|, 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
})2
≤ 16푠2(훾
√
log 푝
푛
+
4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
)2
≤ 푂(푠2 log 푝 log 1∕훿
푛휖2
), (25)
where the second inequality is due to the assumption that at most 푠 elements of (휎푖푗)푖≠푗are non-zero.
For the second term in (24), we have
피‖퐷‖21 ≤ 푝∑푖푗푑2푖푗 = 푝피∑
푖푗
[(휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗)2퐼(퐸푐푖푗
⋂
{휎̂푖푗 = 휎̃푖푗})
+ (휎̂푖푗 − 휎푖푗)2퐼(퐸푐푖푗
⋂
{휎̂푖푗 = 0})]
= 푝피
∑
푖푗
[(휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗)2퐼(퐸푐푖푗) + 푝
∑
푖푗
피휎2푖푗퐼(퐸
푐
푖푗
⋂
{휎̂푖푗 = 0})]. (26)
For the first term in (26), we have
푝
∑
푖푗
피{(휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗)2퐼(퐸푐푖푗)} ≤ 푝∑
푖푗
[피(휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗)6]
1
3ℙ
2
3 (퐸푐푖푗) (27)
≤ 퐶푝 ⋅ 푝2 1
푛휖2
푝−3 = 푂( 1
푛휖2
),
where the first inequality is due to Hölder inequality and the second inequality is due to
the fact that 피(휎̃푖푗−휎푖푗)8 ≤ 퐶3[피(휎∗푖푗−휎푖푗)8+피푛8푖푗]. Since 푛푖푗 is a Gaussian distribution,
we have [21] 피푛8푖푗 ≤ 퐶4휎81 = 푂( 1푛휖 ). For the first term 피(휎∗푖푗 −휎푖푗)8, since 푥푖 is sampledfrom a sub-Gaussian distribution (2), byWhittle Inequality (Theorem 2 in [22] or [16]),
the quadratic form 휎∗푖푗 satisfies 피(휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗)8 ≤ 퐶5 1푛 for some positive constant 퐶5 > 0.
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For the second term of (26), we have
푝
∑
푖푗
피휎2푖푗퐼(퐸
푐
푖푗
⋂
{휎̂푖푗 = 0})
= 푝
∑
푖푗
피휎2푖푗퐼(|휎푖푗| > 4훾√ log 푝푛 + 16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
)
× 퐼(|휎̃푖푗| ≤ 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
)
≤ 푝∑
푖푗
피휎2푖푗퐼(|휎푖푗| > 4훾√ log 푝푛 + 16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
)
× 퐼(|휎푖푗| − |휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≤ 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
)
≤ 푝∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗피퐼(|휎푖푗| > 4훾√ log 푝푛 + 16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
)퐼(|휎̃푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≥ 34 |휎푖푗|)
≤ 푝∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗피퐼(|휎푖푗| > 4훾√ log 푝푛 + 16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
)퐼(|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| + |푛푖푗| ≥ 34 |휎푖푗|)
≤ 푝∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗ℙ
({|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≥ 34 |휎푖푗| − |푛푖푗|}⋂{|휎푖푗| > 4훾
√
log 푝
푛
+
16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
})
= 푝
∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗ℙ
({|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≥ 34 |휎푖푗| − |푛푖푗|}⋂{|푛푖푗| ≤ 14 |휎푖푗|}⋂
{|휎푖푗| > 4훾√ log 푝푛 + 16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
})
+ 푝
∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗ℙ
({|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≥ 34 |휎푖푗| − |푛푖푗|}⋂{|푛푖푗| ≥ 14 |휎푖푗|}⋂{|휎푖푗| > 4훾
√
log 푝
푛
+
16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
}) (28)
≤ 푝∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗ℙ
({|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≥ 12 |휎푖푗|}⋂{|휎푖푗| > 4훾
√
log 푝
푛
+
16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
})
+ 푝
∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗ℙ
({|푛푖푗| ≥ 14 |휎푖푗|}⋂{|휎푖푗| > 4훾
√
log 푝
푛
+
16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
})
.
(29)
10
For the second term of (29), by Lemmas 1 and 2 we have
푝
∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗ℙ({|푛푖푗| ≥ 14 |휎푖푗|}⋂{|휎푖푗| > 4훾
√
log 푝
푛
+
16
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝
푛휖
})
≤ 푝∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗ℙ(|푛푖푗| ≥ 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿 log 푝
푛휖
})ℙ(|푛푖푗| > 14휎푖푗)
≤ 퐶푝∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗 ⋅ exp(−
(훾
√
log 푝
푛 + 4휎1
√
log 푝)2
2휎21
) exp(−
휎2푖푗
32휎21
)
≤ 퐶휎21푝 ⋅ 푝2 exp(−훾
2 log 푝
2푛휎21
)푝−8 (30)
≤ 퐶휎21푝−5 2푛휎
2
1
훾2 log 푝
= 푂(
log 1∕훿
푛휖2
). (31)
For the first term of (29), by Lemma 2 we have
푝
∑
푖푗
휎2푖푗ℙ({|휎∗푖푗 − 휎푖푗| ≥ 12 |휎푖푗|}⋂{|휎푖푗| ≥ 4훾
√
log 푝
푛
})
≤ 푝
푛
∑
푖푗
푛휎2푖푗 exp(−푛
2휎2푖푗
훾2
)퐼(|휎푖푗| ≥ 4훾√ log 푝푛 )
≤ 푝
푛
∑
푖푗
[푛휎2푖푗 exp(−푛
휎2푖푗
훾2
)] exp(−푛
휎2푖푗
훾2
)퐼(|휎푖푗| ≥ 4훾√ log 푝푛 )
≤ 퐶 푝3
푛
푝−16 = 푂(1
푛
). (32)
Thus in total, we have피‖퐷‖21 = 푂( log 1∕훿푛휖2 ). Thismeans that피‖Σ̂−Σ‖21 = 푂( 푠2 log 푝 log 1∕훿푛휖2 ),which completes the proof.
Corollary 1. For any 1 ≤ 푤 ≤∞, the matrix Σ̂ in (10) after the first step of thresholding
satisfies
‖Σ̂ − Σ‖2푤 ≤ 푂(푠2 log 푝 log 1훿푛휖2 ), (33)
where the 푤-norm of any matrix 퐴 is defined as ‖퐴‖푤 = sup ‖퐴푥‖푤‖푥‖푤 . Specifically, for
a matrix 퐴 = (푎푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푝, ‖퐴‖1 = sup푗 ∑푖 |푎푖푗| is the maximum absolute column sum,
and ‖퐴‖∞ = sup푖∑푗 |푎푖푗| is the maximum absolute row sum.
Comparing the bound in the above corollarywith the optimalminimax rateΘ( 푠2 log 푝푛 )in [16] for the non-private case, we can see that the impact of the differential privacy is
to make the number of efficient sample from 푛 to 푛휖2. It is an open problem to determine
whether the bound in Theorem 2 is tight.
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Proof of Corollary 1. By Riesz-Thorin interpolation theorem [23], we have
‖퐴‖푤 ≤ max{‖퐴‖1, ‖퐴‖2, ‖퐴‖∞}
for any matrix 퐴 and any 1 ≤ 푤 ≤ ∞. Since Σ+ − Σ is a symmetric matrix, we have‖Σ+−Σ‖2 ≤ ‖Σ+−Σ‖1 and ‖Σ+−Σ‖1 = ‖Σ+−Σ‖∞. Thus, by the proof of Theorem2 we get this corollary.
4.3. Extension to Local Differential Privacy
One advantage of our Algorithm 1 is that it can be easily extended to the locally
differentially private (LDP) model.
Differential privacy in the local model.. In LDP, we have a data universe , 푛 play-
ers with each holding a private data record 푥푖 ∈ , and a server that is in charge ofcoordinating the protocol. An LDP protocol proceeds in 푇 rounds. In each round, the
server sends a message, which sometime is called a query, to a subset of the players,
requesting them to run a particular algorithm. Based on the queries, each player 푖 in
the subset selects an algorithm 푄푖, run it on her data, and sends the output back to theserver.
Definition 3. [24] An algorithm푄 is (휖, 훿)-locally differentially private (LDP) if for all
pairs 푥, 푥′ ∈ , and for all events퐸 in the output space of푄, we have Pr[푄(푥) ∈ 퐸] ≤
푒휖Pr[푄(푥′) ∈ 퐸] + 훿. A multi-player protocol is 휖-LDP if for all possible inputs and
runs of the protocol, the transcript of player i’s interaction with the server is 휖-LDP. If
푇 = 1, we say that the protocol is (휖, 훿) non-interactive LDP.
Inspired by Algorithm 1, it is easy to extend our DP algorithm to the LDP model.
The idea is that each 푋푖 perturbs its covariance and aggregates the noisy version ofcovariance, see Algorithm 2 for detail.
The following theorem shows that the error bound of the output in Algorithm 2 is
the same as the the bound in Theorem 2 asymptotically, whose proof is almost the same
as in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. The output Σ+ of Algorithm 2 satisfies:
피‖Σ̂ − Σ‖22 = 푂(푠2 log 푝 log 1훿푛휖2 ), (35)
where the expectation is taken over the coins of the Algorithm and the randomness of
{푥1, 푥2,⋯ , 푥푛}. Moreover, Σ̂ in (34) satisfies ‖Σ̂ − Σ‖2푤 = 푂( 푠 log 푝 log 1훿푛휖2 ).
5. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Algorithm 1 and 2 practically on
synthetic datasets.
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Algorithm 2 LDP-Thresholding
퐈퐧퐩퐮퐭: 휖, 훿 are privacy parameters, {푥1, 푥2,⋯ , 푥푛} ∼ 푃 ∈(휎2, 푠).
1: for Each 푖 ∈ [푛] do
2: Denote 푥̃푖푥̃푇푖 = 푥푖푥푇푖 + 푧푖, where 푧푖 ∈ ℝ푝×푝 is a symmetric matrix with itsupper triangle ( including the diagonal) being i.i.d samples from (0, 휎2); here
휎2 = 2 ln(1.25∕훿)휖2 , and each lower triangle entry is copied from its upper trianglecounterpart.
3: end for
4: Compute Σ̃ = (휎̃푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푝 = 1푛
∑푛
푖=1 푥̃푖푥̃
푇
푖 ,
5: Define the thresholding estimator Σ̂ = (휎̂푖푗)1≤푖,푗≤푛 as
휎̂푖푗 = 휎̃푖푗 ⋅ 퐼[|휎̃푖푗| > 훾√ log 푝푛 + 4
√
2 ln 1.25∕훿
√
log 푝√
푛휖
]. (34)
6: Let the eigen-decomposition of Σ̂ as Σ̂ = ∑푝푖=1 휆푖푣푖푣푇푖 . Let 휆+ = max{휆푖, 0} be thepositive part of 휆푖, then define Σ+ = ∑푝푖=1 휆+푣푖푣푇푖 .7: return Σ+.
Data Generation. We first generate a symmetric sparse matrix 푈̃ with the sparsity ratio
푠푟, that is, there are 푠푟×푝×푝 non-zero entries of the matrix. Then, we let 푈 = 푈̃ +휆퐼푝
for some constant 휆 to make 푈 positive semi-definite and then scale it to 푈 = 푈푐 bysome constant 푐 which makes the norm of samples less than 1 (with high probability)1.
Finally, we sample {푥1,⋯ , 푥푛} from the multivariate Gaussian distribution  (0, 푈 ).In this paper, we will use set 휆 = 50 and 푐 = 200.
Experimental Settings. To measure the performance, we compare the 퓁1 and 퓁2 norm
of relative error, respectively. That is, ‖Σ+−푈‖2‖푈‖2 or ‖Σ+−푈‖1‖푈‖1 with the sample size 푛 in
three different settings: 1) we set 푝 = 100, 휖 = 1, 훿 = 1푛 and change the sparse ratio
푠푟 = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5}. 2) We set 휖 = 1, 훿 = 1푛 , 푠푟 = 0.2, and let the dimensionality 푝
vary in {50, 100, 200, 500}. 3) We fix 푝 = 200, 훿 = 1푛 , 푠푟 = 0.2 and change the privacylevel as 휖 = {0.1, 0.5, 1, 2}. We run each experiment 20 times and take the average
error as the final one.
Experimental Results. Figure 1 and 2 are the results of DP-Thresholding (Algorithm
1) with 퓁2 and 퓁1 relative error, respectively. Figure 3 and 4 are the results of LDP-Thresholding (Algorithm 2) with 퓁2 and 퓁1 relative error, respectively. From the figureswe can see that: 1) if the sparsity ratio is large i.e., the underlying covairance matrix is
1Although the distribution is not bounded by 1, actually, as we see from previous section, we can obtain
the same result as long as the 퓁2 norm of the samples is bounded by 1.
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Figure 1: Experiment results of Algorithm 1 for 퓁2-norm relative error. The left one is for different sparsitylevels, the middle one is for different dimensionality 푝, and the right one is for different privacy level 휖.
Figure 2: Experiment results of Algorithm 1 for 퓁1-norm relative error. The left one is for different sparsitylevels, the middle one is for different dimensionality 푝, and the right one is for different privacy level 휖.
more dense, the relative error will be larger, this is due to the fact showed in Theorem
2 and 3 that the error depends on the sparsity 푠. 2) The dimensionality only slightly
affects the relative error. That is, even if we double the value of 푝, the error increases
only slightly. This is consistent with our theoretical analysis in Theorem 2 and 3 which
says that the error of our private estimators is only logarithmically depending on 푝 (i.e.,
log 푝). 3) With the privacy parameter 휖 increases (which means more private), the error
will become larger. This has also been showed in previous theorems.
In summary, all the experimental results support our theoretical analysis.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
In the paper, we study the problem of estimating the sparse covariance matrix of
a bounded sub-Gaussian distribution under differential privacy model and propose a
method called DP-Threshold, which achieves a non-trivial error bound and can be easily
extended to the local model. Experiments on synthetic datasets yield consistent results
with the theoretical analysis.
There are still some open problems for this problem. Firstly, although the thresh-
olding method can achieve non-trivial error bound for our private estimator, in practice
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Figure 3: Experiment results of Algorithm 2 for 퓁2-norm relative error. The left one is for different sparsitylevels, the middle one is for different dimensionality 푝, and the right one is for different privacy level 휖.
Figure 4: Experiment results of Algorithm 2 for 퓁1-norm relative error. The left one is for different sparsitylevels, the middle one is for different dimensionality 푝, and the right one is for different privacy level 휖.
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it is hart to find the best threshold. Thus, an open problem is how to get the best thresh-
old. Secondly, as mentioned in the related work section, there are many recent results
on private Gaussian estimation, which may make the 퓁2 norm of the samples greaterthan 1. Thus, it is an interesting problem to extend our method to a general Gaussian
distribution.
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